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ABSTRACT 
This paper seeks to investigate internal and external factors with relation 
to regulations in order to predict difficulties which the banks are exposed. 
The sample consists of 368 banks in 8 European countries for the period 
2004-2007. The model was built primarily only on a set of ratios con-
stituting the CAMEL rating system (Capital adequacy, Asset qu ality, 
Management quality, Earnings ability, Liquidity position). Secondly, we 
added the variables related to the regulatory environment. The applica-
tion of the method panel logit shows that financial ratios relating to the 
rating system (CAMEL) are correlated with the likelihood of problems 
measured by binary variables. The probability of occurrence of problems 
in these banks is positively correlated with the presence of an explicit 
system of deposit insurance and negatively correlated with the presence of 
auditors who provide information to regulators in the event of illegal ac-
tivities committed by managers. The ability to prosecute these regulators 
for their actions has a negative effect on the probability of distress. The 
role of the Central Bank in monitoring activity is also very important to 
maintain system’s stability. 
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Introduction
The current crisis which has started since about 2008 has taken a set of considering  the 
events it has induced incite to give special attention to the pertinence of regulations 
in the inside as well as in the outside of institutional organization such as banks. The 
accession of dysfunction incites to challenge classic methods usually used to predict 
the factors which constitute some of the causes of crisis inducing high costs to be 
avoided. More generally, the main questions we can make are concerned with the 
fact if the procedures which are adopted by some authorities take into account the 
special state of bank institutions when making decisions to enforce regulations? Is 
it possible that classic plans, such as the conventional device, the deposit insurance, 
the external auditors, and the lender of last resort, incite to increase the exposition 
of financial institutions to greater risk?
The primacy of recessions and scandals which have gone with the rapid spreading of 
tension in the international level leads to conclude that the progress realized in the 
in smoothing the vulnerability remains insufficient and inadequate. Considering 
these questions this paper seeks to reconsider the question about the early warning 
systems (hereafter EWS) which allow to identify the banks likely to be object of 
distress and failure. Secondly it permits to take necessary steps likely possible to 
solve the problem of dysfunction before it occurs.
The specificity of this study compared to previous one is that it links the stability of 
financial institutions to standard norms usually applied in international level. These 
norms includes among others techniques of internal analysis (Ratios) as well as 
institutional mechanisms which are able to give response to correction of asymmetric 
information worries and that of hazard moral (regulation variables). In this line, it 
will be important to give the large sample of banks to use methods already used 
in order to analyze the positions of financial institutions before the crises. Results 
are in conformity the idea that standard tools to predict in an irrevocably ways 
the distress. Once there are institutional ones, the dispositions usually used leads 
sometimes to exacerbate the moral hazard problems. This phenomenon which is 
more likely to appear in economies with good risk management is realized through 
a large diversification followed by a high centralization of assets. Organizations 
largely known as systematic (that with large size) are consequently at the forefront 
of public attention. This study seeks to detect early difficulties and not failures to 
allow political and monetary authorities to have enough time to take the appropriate 
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corrective measures and fill gaps that might disrupt the normal functioning 
of banks.  In fact, we tried to make a synthesis between the various previous studies.
The objective of this study is to determine the integration effects of variables 
related to the regulatory environment, not just the effect of accounting 
ratios of bank distress. The integration of these variables can provide insight on 
improving supervision system.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follow: the first section presents the 
literature review and the previous empirical findings about the prediction of failures. 
The second describes data and methodology.   Results and discussions are presented 
in the third section. Finally, the section 4 concludes.
Literature review
Following the multiple economic crises literature gives more attention to the 
prediction of bank failures. This approach presents great importance in real economy 
since it allows to judge the effectiveness of the process of regulations revised for 
many times spanning the last decades.  Since the study of Sinkey (1975), numerous 
authors developed several techniques to predict the failure of financial institutions. 
This author has used multivariable discriminative analysis considering a sample of 
220 American banks. About a half of these banks have been object of failure during 
the 1969-1972 period. Among the one hundred variables he used only ten which 
have presented a significant effect especially that related to the specificity of banks.  
Altman (1977) developed a system for identifying serious financial problems in sav-
ings and loan associations. He used 25 ratios representing liquidity, asset quality, cap-
ital adequacy and earnings. Only12variables can explain the banking failure. Panta-
lone and Platt (1987) proposed a model integrating relative ratios of the CAMEL 
rating system. 
They used a sample of 113 failed banks and 226 non-failed over the period of 
the early 80s. Using the logit method, the significant variables are representative 
of profitability, management quality, leverage, diversification and economic envi-
ronment.
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Thomson (1991) examined the bank failures that occurred in the United States dur-
ing the 1980s. He used 16 variables. Unlike other studies, he included variables re-
lated to economic conditions in domestic markets banks. 
Variables specific to the banking sector ratios were calculated from the balance sheet 
and income statement and represented capital adequacy, the risk of the loan portfo-
lio, risk management, liquidity and income. The result shows that the probability 
that a bank will fail is a function of variables related to its solvency. Economic con-
ditions in the markets where a bank operates also appear to affect the probability of 
bank failure as much as four years before the failure date.
Barr and Siems (1997) proposed a model for early warning of bank difficul-
ties, whose aim is to realize the difficulties two years prior to insolvency. The ex-
planatory variables included are representative of the CAMEL rating system plus 
a variable to capture local economic condition, quality management has been ap-
proximated using technical efficiency, derived from the nonparametric DEA (Data 
Envelopment Analysis) methodology. The result indicates that management is, in-
deed, important to the successful operation of a bank. 
Capelle-Blanchard and Chauveau(2004)  used the same methodology for the main 
European commercial banks from 1993 to 2000 and  have examined the potential 
contribution to bank supervision of a model designed to include an off-site proxy 
of the management quality based only on publicly available financial information.  
The relevance of their EWS depends to some extent on its accuracy in predicting 
which banks will have their solvency degraded. They show that proxies for CAM-
ELS (S: Sensitivity to market risk) do a good job for identifying the banks that are 
likely to have their solvency degraded in the future. 
Gonzalez-Hermosillo (1999) examined the bank failures in the U.S., Mexico and 
Colombia, which took place in the 1980s and 1990s. She used the macroeconom-
ics and microeconomics variables. The result shows that a low capital equity and 
reserves coverage of problem loan ratio is a leading indicator of bank distress, signal-
ing a high likelihood of near term failure. Doganay et al., (2006) developed warning 
systems to predict bank failures, for at least three years before the date of bankrupt-
cy. Using a sample of 42 banks in which 19 have been object of failures during the 
period 1997-2000 and considering twenty seven ratios, the authors conclude that 
logit model are the most appropriate to predict bankruptcy. Testing the same model 
for a sample of 906 institutions in which 319 have supported failures spanning the 
Predicting Banking Distress in European Countries
65Volume 3        Number 1        Spring 2013
period from 1980 to 1984,  Barth et al., (1985) found that the composition of the 
loan portfolio, the capital ratio and the income structure affect significantly the 
bank failures.  Godlewski (2003) integrated CAMEL variables in the specific case 
of emerging countries over the 1999-2000 period. The sample includes 1853 banks 
from Asia, Latin America and some Central and Eastern Europe countries with 270 
of them are failed banks.  Using the logit model, the author concludes the prob-
ability of bankruptcy is negatively correlated to the variables he used in his model. 
To investigate the same phenomenon for the cases of Japanese and Indonesian banks 
Montgomery et al., (2005) Introduce 18 financial ratios considering information in 
balance sheets and income statements.
Similarly, Konstandina (2006) identified for the case of Russia six macroeconomic 
factors and thirteen other specific explanatory variables related to banks to predict 
their failure. The author attributes specifically the increase in bankruptcy to the raise 
in bad loans and to the purchase of treasury bills.  The use of a proportional hazard 
models have enabled her to identify the factors that are able to slow down the risk 
of bank in a period of financial crisis.  Similarly to what have been theoretically pre-
dicted, the author confirms the result according to which the first banks exposed to 
bankruptcy risk are less efficient. 
Considering 134 banks from sample composed of 11European countries Naouar 
(2007) found that variables measuring the regulatory, institutional and legal environ-
ments such as set in La Porta et al., (1998) and given in the World Bank reports con-
stitute the most influential since they impact the process of risk taking. This confirms 
largely the fact that this factors are not without effects. The same results are shown in 
Abdennour et al., (2008). The use of an early warning system for banking problems 
based on accounting ratios and factors related to regulatory, institutional and legal 
environment has been with great importance for financial institutions in emerging 
countries. In this line, Badjio (2009) proposed application for the countries of Central 
Africa. He introduced variables representing the CAMEL rating system and taking 
into account the management style of banks in the Central African Economic and 
Monetary Community. Three variables have been statistically significant which are 
ratios measuring (Equity / Total loans), (Total Deposits / Total Assets) and (Total op-
erating income / Total assets). The first has a negative effect while the two others have a 
positive influence on the dependent variable of his model. Giovanis (2010) developed 
a model of EWS of distress using a logistic regression and an Adaptive Neuro-Fuzzy 
Inference System (ANFIS). He adopted the same procedure in Gentry et al, (1985) 
to specify whether or not the company has been through some financial distress. In-
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stitutions that distribute a few dividends may be having financial difficulties. Using 
a sample of 179 financial institutions from Taiwan Security Exchange (TSE) during 
the period 2002-2008, the author concluded, finally, that the Neuro-Fuzzy Inference 
system constitutes the most appropriate tool for financial risk management and for 
decision making in the Central Bank.
Besides the financial ratios some researchers have used macroeconomic variables. 
Banks are strongly influenced by contractions that the economy experiences over time. 
Banking distress is highly influenced by a number of macro variables. Among the vari-
ables, there are: interest rate, inflation, real GDP growth, output downturns, adverse 
terms of trade shocks, credit expansion, market pressure and losses of foreign exchange. 
These macro variables influence the functioning of financial and economic systems as a 
whole ( Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 1998, 2000;  Hutchison and McDill, 1999; 
Hutchison, 2002;  Domac and Mertinez-Peria, 2000;  Frankel Langrin, 2001;  Heffer-
nan, 1996;  Borovikova , 2000;  Yilmaz, 2003   ;  Gunsel, 2008). The use of the mac-
roeconomic variables will not be the object of our search. Our principal objec-
tive of this study is to determine the integration effects of variables in the regulatory 
environment, not just the effect of accounting ratios of bank distress.
Data and methodology 
The sample:
Our sample consists of European banks. The choice of these countries is motivat-
ed by the number of bank defaults in these countries. It is very important in recent 
years.   Many European banks were hit by the 2008 crisis, as U.S. banks but to 
a lesser degree.  Banks do not seem to remember the lessons of past crises. 
Some countries in our sample have been hit by a crisis of indebtedness. Indeed, the 
Greek state has destroyed the entire financial and monetary European system.
Recognizing the principle of “Too Big To Fail”, we select only big sized banks. We 
adopt this selection since the large banks are behind the latest crisis. Once they ben-
efit from an implicit insurance against bankruptcy these banks increase their risky 
activities. So, to improve their profitability they are tempted to take more risk.The 
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data used was from the BankScope database. It includes balance sheets and income 
statements of the selected banks.  
This information helps to build a set of ratios constituting the CAMEL rating sys-
tem. The pretreatment of the data gave a sample of 368 banks in eight European 
countries. 
Initially, a total asset was used as a criterion for exclusion of small banks. This tech-
nique was already applied by Godlewski (2004). The size of those banks   is below 
the fifth percentile. So to integrate the counterparty risk, we selected the financial 
institutions that provide more credit. i.e banks  whose  total loans / assets ratio  is 
greater  than 32, 88% (the fifth percentile is eliminated).
A commercial bank is characterized by a high level of deposits.  For this reason we 
opted for banks with high levels of deposits. The elimination of the fifth percentile 
can retain the institutions whose total deposits/ total assets is greater than 45,83% .
The incentives to undertake excessive risk come mainly from the banking regulation, 
and then two sources were used. The first comes from the study of Barth et al.,(2001) 
made  to the World Bank and the second made by Demirgüç-Kunt and  Detragiache, 
(2008). In the first study, the data collected from several surveys have been subdivided 
into ten sub-bases. Each one focuses on one aspect of standardization activity and pru-
dential supervision: supervision of capital, the adoption of a system of deposit insur-
ance, market discipline, the transparency of the banking market, ownership structure, 
liquidi ty and management of monitoring committees. The second study identifies 
factors that influence decisions about financial security of a country. It uses a compre-
hensive data covering 180 countries over the period 1960-2003.This analysis focuses 
on how institutional factors influence the adoption of a system of deposit insurance. 
The majority of this data is qualitative (often binary).
The variables:
Within the model, we attempt to explain the dependent variable (Y) which presents 
the probability of distress:
 
iti Xit e
Yprob   1
11 
Ahlem-Selma MESSAI  / Fathi JOUINI
68 Journal of Economic and Social Studies
Yi,t  is the binary dependent variable latent bank (i)at the period (t) i:
the number of banks from1 to 368;
Xi,t  is the explanatory variable of bank (i) at  (t). 
 t: is the study period from 2004 to 2007.
: the constant
i: the coefficient of explanatory variable Xi.
Yit = 1 if the bank is undercapitalized
Yit = 0 if the bank is well capitalized.
So to distinguish between a healthy bank and another in difficulty, we used the 
binary values  0 and 1.
A distressed bank = 1.
A healthy bank = 0.
Researchers often use the Tier (1) capital ratio, which is equal to 4%, or the ratio of capital 
Tier1 + Tier 2, which is equal to 8% as a threshold to distinguish between the two states.
As part of this work, we refer to the works of Estrella et al., (2000) and Abdennour 
et al,(2008), taking 5.5% as an indicator. This proxy is considered a good indicator 
to detect early the first signs of banking fragility.  Indeed, a bank whose capital ratio 
is above 5.5% is a healthier bank then a bank whose capital ratio is below 5.5% is 
considered in difficulties.
Presentation of the explanatory variables:
Our model includes two types of variables to predict the banking distress which are 
CAMEL variables and those related to regulatory environments. 
Everywhere in the world, the systems of supervision try to evaluate the situation 
of banks through a set of financial ratios. Compared to other monitoring systems 
(PATROL in Italy, SAAB in France, BAKIS in Germany), CAMEL seems the easiest 
and the quickest to establish. It includes the most important indicators of fragility 
covering risks related to the capital adequacy, the asset quality, the profitability and 
the liquidity position. Moreover, the treatment of fragility using other systems can 
be made case by case, which generates a late prediction of problems. In addition, in 
the operating framework, they seem more costly than the CAMEL, so they present 
different disadvantages to the regulator. The CAMEL reveals financial information 
extracted from balance sheet and income statement of the bank. Calculated ratios 
Predicting Banking Distress in European Countries
69Volume 3        Number 1        Spring 2013
can explain the situation of banks. The acronym CAMEL combines the following 
five criteria: the capital adequacy (C), the asset quality (A), the management quality 
(M), the earnings ability (E), and the liquidity position (L). 
Each indicator is approximated by one or several financial ratios. In this study, two 
ratios were used to explain each criterion by the acronym CAMEL. The choice of 
these ratios is based on them which are most relevant to the studied topic. Table 1 
presents all ratios we used in our model as well as their expected signs.
The first two ratios (R1 and R2) indicate the adequacy of capital to the total loans. 
The ratio equity / total assets (R1) evaluates the ability of banks to assume their obli-
gations to absorb unexpected losses and to absorb shocks. The second ratio, Equity / 
Total loans, is considered as a buffer to absorb potential losses (Godlewski, 2004). It 
measures the hedge funds against credit risk. These first two ratios affect negatively 
the probability of default. The quality of the assets, as approximated by R3 and R4 
ratios, affects positively the probability of being undercapitalized. 
Table 1. List of CAMEL’s variables 
Ratios Variables  CAMEL Expected sign
R1 Equity / Total Assets C -
R2 Equity/ Total Loans C -
R3 Net loans / Total Assets A +
R4 Total Other earnings / Total Assets A +
R5 Personnel expenses / Total operating expenses M -
R6 Total operating income/ Total Assets M -
R7 Net income/ Equity (ROE) E +/-
R8 Net income / Total Assets(ROA) E +/-
R9 Total Deposits / Total Assets L +/-
R10 Total Deposits / Total liabilities L +/-
The ratio Net Loans/Total Assets explains the importance given to loans. Indeed, 
the core business of banks is granting credits. This is, however, a risky activity in-
creasing normally the likelihood of difficulty. The ratio of Total Other Operating 
Income / Total Assets measures the share of income generated outside the activity of 
the banking intermediation. It has a positive effect on the probability of default. In-
deed, banks with investments in other projects (often high risk) present a significant 
probability to be in difficulty. 
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Management quality is assessed by the ratios Personnel expenses / Total Operating Ex-
penses (R5) and Total Operating income / Total Assets (R6). Indeed, the effectiveness 
of managing risk increases with the consideration of the needs of staff (personnel costs 
while positively affecting the quality of management). Moreover, the probability of 
presence of problems in credit institutions is negatively correlated with the proportion 
of personnel costs of total operating expenses. The banks are undercapitalized char-
acterized by low profitability. This profitability is measured by the ratios R7 and R8. 
The ratio Net income / Equity allows shareholders to monitor the returns earned on 
their investments, it is a guarantee of a sustainable solvency. According to the CAMEL 
model, this ratio allows to assess the level of profits relative to the capital invested. The 
ratio Net income/ Total Assets, measures the rate of return on average total assets held 
by the institution. This is an indicator of overall profitability. 
The large level of deposits in total assets and total liabilities, measured respectively 
by R9 and R10 can have positive or negative effects on the likelihood of difficulty 
of the banks. The increase in deposits is an indicator of liquidity’s availability. Thus, 
the bank can meet its commitments. In case of bank runs, the rush of depositors at 
the counters increases the distress probability. The regulatory environment variables 
and assumptions with CAMEL’s variables, we also incorporated the external deter-
minants of default, which are more particularly variables related to the regulatory 
environment. These estimated variables (binary variables), allow regulators to act in 
the interest of the bank has a serious trouble(the possibility of prosecution of super-
visors for their acts, auditors inform the supervisors of illegal activities committed 
by managers, monitoring function is performed by the Central 
Bank and the existence of an insurance deposit system). So, we formulated the fol-
lowing hypotheses:
H 1: When the auditors inform the supervisors about illegal activities through the 
audit report, the supervisors can then take appropriate disciplinary actions and can 
ensure system stability.
H 2: The presence of an insurance deposit system can prevent bank runs and can 
ensure stability.
H 3: The possibility of prosecution of supervisors for their acts, reduces the likeli-
hood of distress.
H4: The system stability can be maintained when the oversight function is delegated 
to the Central Bank. 
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Goodhart, (2008) used several regulatory variables mentioned in recent studies as 
factors that explain the failure of the system. Among these elements we can evoke: 
1. Deposit insurance system;
2. Insolvency of the bank, and effectiveness “prompt corrective action”;
3. Money market operations performed by Central Banks.
Indeed, when the Central Bank oversight decreases the probability of being under-
capitalized.
First, the introduction of a deposit insurance fund protects depositors. It can reduce 
the excess of banking risk that no longer generates significant revenues to indicate a 
good performance to its customers and thus avoid liquidity problems. In most cases, 
all deposits are not covered and therefore a minimum of market discipline on the 
part of depositors are insured. This encourages banks to take more risks.
Table 2. Variables of regulatory environment
Dummy Variables Définition Auteurs
D1
regulatory discipline (-)
=1when the auditors report 
fraud or abuse committed by the 
leaders to supervisors 
=0 otherwise
Barth and al (2001)
Godlewski(2003),
Abdennour and al (2008)
D2 Deposit insurance
(+/-)
=1 in the presence of a system of 
explicit deposit insurance
=0 otherwise       
Barth et al (2001)
Godlewski(2003), Demirgüç-
Kunt.A    and Detragiache. E 
(2008), Naouar(2007)
Abdennour and al (2008)
 
D3 Responsability of 
supervisors
(+/-)
=1 in the case of prosecution of 
supervisors for their actions.
=0 otherwise
Barth and al (2001)
Godlewski(2003),
Naouar(2007)
Abdennour and al (2008)
D4   Role of CB in 
monitoring (+/-)
=1 if the Central Bank has the task 
of monitoring and supervision
=0 if the control and the 
supervision are carried out by 
another independent institution.
Barth and al (2001)
Abdennour and al (2008)
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Regarding the variable of the insurance deposits, we note that all the countries (eight 
countries) have an explicit system of deposit insurance. Therefore it is difficult to 
estimate the impact of this variable on the bank situation. For this reason, we follow 
the reasoning proposed by Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2008) by integrating 
the determinants of the deposit insurance system.
DemirgüçKunt and Detragiache (2008) compile eight characteristics of deposit in-
surance. These are: The coverage ratio, insurance of foreign deposits, the coverage of 
interbank deposits,  the existence of an insurer, the payment of coverage, premiums 
are adjusted for risk, the administration of the premium (for the state or the private 
sector),  and membership is voluntary or mandatory.
Based on this study, we approximated the variable relating to the existence of a de-
posit insurance system and its determinants by using the principal component anal-
ysis (PCA).
Table3. Determinants of deposit insurance
Factor Variables Measure Author
F
Foreign deposit insurance (D5)
 (+/-)
1 if there exists
Demirgüç-
Kunt et al.
(2008)
0 otherwise
Co-insurance  (D6)
(+/-)
1 if there exists
0 otherwise
Interbank deposit insurance (D7) 
(+/-)
1 if there exists
0 otherwise
The premium risk-adjusted (D8)
(+/-)
1 if exists
0 otherwise
Funding for the premium (D9)
(+/-)
0 by the bank only
1 by the state and the bank together
Administration of the guarantee fund (D10) 
(+/-)
0 public
1  private
Analysis and interpretation of results:
To test a model for detecting banking distress, it is useful to make these three tasks:
• The determination of correlations between the dependent variable and different 
ratios.
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• Logit regression on CAMEL variables.
• Logit regression on CAMEL variables and factors that explain the regulatory 
environment.
According to t-test for independent sample, we note that healthy banks have higher 
solvency ratio and hedge ratio of loans by equity. Distressed banks have the follow-
ing characteristics: 
- These banks have a low capital ratio. 
- They cannot cover all loans. 
- They have also several related activities, 
- less personal expenses and 
- A weak economic profitability.
Table 4. T-Test for independent sample 
 Ratios
Mean Distressed 
banks
Mean
Healthy banks
The student’s t
R1 Equity / Total Assets  0.037366  0.092207 -31,339***
R2 Equity / Total Loans  0.078390  0.155895 -15,695***
R3  Net loans/ Total Assets  0.561438  0.639403 -7,687***
R4 Total other operating income  / Total Assets  0.390487  0.301731 9, 113***
R5 Personnel expenses/ Total operating expenses  0.478710  0.492294 -2,129**
R6 Total operating income / Total assets  0.020373  0.037457 -13,703***
R7 Net income/ equity (ROE)  0.112839  0.085162 5,184***
R8 Net income / Total Assets(ROA)  0.003974  0.008146 -10, 465***
R9 Total Deposits / Total Assets  0.730666  0.726927 0, 347
R10 Total Deposits / Total liabilities  0.760226  0.802188 -3,692***
Significant at the level of : ( *** )  1%, ( ** ) 5% or ( * ) 10%.
Indeed, in the presence of difficulties probability, a bank has a risk of insolven-
cy and a low level of coverage of loans. This is explained by the negative and sig-
nificant difference of the first two ratios. Concerning profitability (presented by the 
ratios R7 and R8) two cases may exist:  the bank that has a probability of default 
generates a low profitability. Or, the bank seeks by all way to realize more revenues 
and therefore take more risks. Since profitability is an increasing function of risk (a 
positive mean difference indicated by the ratioR7). Moreover, an increase in profit-
ability increases the excess risk and potential distress. 
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Correlation
The correlation between the explanatory variables and the dependent variable is pre-
sented in the table below.  The majority of the explanatory variables have expected 
signs. 
Table 5. The correlation between dependent variable et independents variables
corrélation T student
R1 Equity / Total Assets -0.772876 -46.69796***
R2 Equity / Total loans -0.563211 -26.13278***
R3 Net loans/ Total Assets -0.217567 -8.546381***
R4 Total other operating income  / Total Assets 0.253322 10.03998***
R5 Personnel expenses/ Total operating expenses -0.058349 -2.240956**
R6 Total operating income / Total Assets -0.450022 -19.32112***
R7 Net income / Equity (ROE) 0.143175 5.546553***
R8 Net income / Total Assets(ROA) -0.355255 -14.57115***
R9 Total Deposits / Total Assets 0.070277 2.701125***
R10 Total Deposits / Total  liabilities -0.071572 -2.751183***
Significant at the level of : ( *** )  1%, ( ** ) 5% or ( * ) 10%.
The correlation test shows that there is a strong relationship between the approxi-
mate ratio of the solvency position and banking problems. This is the similar case 
of management quality approximated by the ratio (Total Operating Income /Total 
Assets) and the ability to realize revenues represented by profitability (Net Income 
/ Total Assets).
Logit model application:
This study covers a period exceeding one year. The econometric method used is 
the Logit Panel. Indeed, when using panel data, incorporating a fixed effect in an 
empirical model representing the individual effect of each bank assumes that the de-
pendent variable can vary according to institutions independently of all the explana-
tory variables in the regression. Nevertheless, the use of fixed effect can lead to un-
desirable results when the estimation period is short (eg. only two years). Moreover, 
when the explanatory variable does not vary with time (eg. regulatory variables) we 
use the random effect. About the estimated qualitative Logit model, the fact, inte-
grating a fixed effect requires exclusion from the sample of all establishments which 
have not had problems (well-capitalized banks). However, it is preferable to use a 
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random effects model since the use of this technique involves the loss of a significant 
amount of information (Demirguç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998).
The use of the bivariate correlation between the explanatory variables shows the 
presence of dependence between certain variables. Then they were tested separately 
seeking the most significant outcome. Indeed, indicators are classified by their de-
gree of relevance for explaining the deterioration in the ratio capital of banks.  In 
addition, each ratio must pass through a sieve of introduction or elimination de-
pending on his individual contribution to explaining the dependent variable. The 
dependence between the ratios retained must be low (see the Pearson correlation for 
independent variables).  In fact, among the 10 ratios only five ratios were selected to 
avoid the problem of multicollinearity.
Table 6.  Pearson correlations for independent variables
R2 R4 R 6 R8 R10
R2 1.000000
R4 0.310776 1.000000
(12.53606)
R6 0.344680 -0.298530 1.000000
(14.07790) (-11.99269)
R8 0.374857 -0.165892 0.464892 1.000000
(15.50263) (-6.449770) (20.13204)
R10 0.284409 0.228212 -0.030003 -0.112675 1.000000
(11.37413) (8.986933) (-1.150869) (-4.347731)
Value in parentheses is the t-student
The estimation results of models are presented in the table below. First, we test the 
Logit model (model 1), where it was built only from the five CAMEL variables. 
Then, in the second model, we add variables related to the regulatory environment 
except the variable relating to the existence of a deposit insurance system (D2). The 
latter is subsequently added at the third model after the application of the princi-
pal component analysis (PCA).
By estimating these three models were found almost the same expected signs. 
The main activity of the bank is granting of credits. The ratio R2 (Equity / Total 
Loans) is the rate of recovery of loans granted by the equity. This ratio is one of the 
best indicators of banking problems. It has negative consequences on the likelihood 
of having problems of bank failures. Indeed, when this variable is high, the bank has 
enough funds to withstand difficultie
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Table 7. Results for the Logit model application 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
R2 Equity/ Total loans -1.249984 ***   -1.089388***   -1.111983***  
R4 Total other operating income  / Total Assets 0.486333*** 0.3536902***   0.4349359*** 
R6 Total operating income / Total Assets -.0227529***   -0.019039***   -0.026969***  
R8 Net Income / Total Assets -0.288018***   -0.2373362*   -0.371062***  
R10 Total Deposits / Total liabilities 0.0419052   -0.139140***    -0.14169***   
D1 Audit -15.54379***   -11.41524***  
D2 Deposit insurance        - 2.853437*   
D3 Responsibility of supervisors -14.05587***   -12.14776***  
D4 Role of CB -4.414858**     -10.3024***   
C Constant -5.511353   27.6227***   24.10395***   
Wald chi2(5)       285.01 438.76 767.62
Likelihood ratio test 401.81 107.34 104.62
AIC 404.134 375.644 374.925
BIC 441.195 428.588 433.163
Number of observations 1472 1472 1472
Significant at the level of : ( *** )  1%, ( ** ) 5% or ( * ) 10%.
The asset quality of the credit institution by the ratio R4 (Total Other operating 
Income / Total Assets) is significant and affects the probability of being in trouble 
positively. A high level of this ratio can be seen as a signal of presence of difficulty 
in banks. 
Management quality represented by the ratio R6 (Total Operating income / Total As-
sets) is statistically significant and negatively correlated with the probability of default.
The economic profitability of the bank (Earning / Total Assets) has an expected negative 
sign and it is significant at 1%. Most often under-capitalized banks have low profitability. 
The liquidity is approximated by R10 (Total Deposits / Total Liabilities) and is a 
positive sign. By this standard, a troubled bank is a bank that has a high proportion 
of deposits. Following a bank run, depositors rush to withdraw deposits for counters 
because they are worried about the health of their banks. During the first estimate 
(model1), this variable appears insignificant. On these variables prescribed type, it 
was seen that after applying the first model we found significant results with the 
exception of R10.
Predicting Banking Distress in European Countries
77Volume 3        Number 1        Spring 2013
Following the introduction of variables related to the regulatory environment by 
estimating the second model, there was improvement in the quality of the model 
(D1 (Audit), D3 (Responsibility of supervisors) and D4 (Role of Central Bank) 
as proposed by Barth et al. (2001). This improvement is justified econometrically 
by smaller values  of AIC and BIC criteria from the first estimated model and the 
degree of significance. The coefficients for the new variables have negative signs and 
are significant at 5%. If we compare the results of this second model to those of 
the first, it shows that the ratio (R10) became significant with a negative sign. This 
can be explained by the presence of an explicit deposit insurance system in these 
eight countries. Indeed, in the presence of these systems, depositors are protected in 
case of bank failure. Depositors have no need to remove their funds deposited with 
banks. Therefore, this guarantee of deposits may limit the bank runs.
The results show that the probability of banking distress is reduced when the auditor 
report to supervisors, by obligation, illegal activities such as fraud or abuse commit-
ted in the internal management by bank managers. The operation of the bank may 
be threatened by the audit check report prepared by the auditor and disciplined 
when it carry out this carefully and objectively. Hypothesis 1 is then accepted.
This probabili t y is a decreasing function when it is possible to take legal action 
against the supervisors for their actions (hypothesis 3 is confirmed). This action has 
the role of early warning of distressed banks in order to encourage them to make 
adjustments to their capital. Accountability of supervisors creates greater regulatory 
discipline and makes more efficient the monitoring process. These two variables (D1 
and D3) are significant at 1% level.
The coefficient of D4 (sign is negative) shows that the Central Bank plays an active 
role in monitoring and supervision and has authority to deal with the problems of 
failure. The exercise of control and supervision of the Central Bank is negatively 
correlated with the probability of being undercapitalized (This variable is significant 
at 5%). Hypothesis 4 is then accepted.
To approximate the variable D2, (presence of deposit insurance) a third model using factor 
analysis (principal component analysis is the procedure followed by Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Detragiache, 2008). This author examines the determinants of deposit insurance, 
along with other variables used in his study; he describes the deposit insurance scheme).
Using a single factor (F) presenting the three critical variables of a system of deposit 
insurance (The administration of funds; Coverage of deposits i.e. foreign, co-insur-
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ance and interbank; and Financing of the premium) shows that the probability of 
difficulty increases with the presence of such a guarantee fund. The presence of such 
a system discourages depositors to monitor their banks because they feel protected. 
Therefore, banks do not respect market discipline that motivates them to take more risks. 
This result is significant only at a threshold of 10%. Hypothesis 2 was therefore rejected.
Whatever the model, the probability of having problems and being undercapital-
ized is negatively correlated with the solvency ratio, quality management, economic 
profitability approximated by ROA (return on assets) and the share of deposits in 
liabilities. By cons, this probability is an increasing function of income from other 
activities.
Furthermore, a bank in distress has the following characteristics:
- A low capital ratio,
- a poor quality of management, 
- a low profitability, 
- Important revenues from other activities and a small proportion of deposits com-
pared to total liabilities. 
Final ly, we can conclude from the results that the banking supervision has a sig-
nificant effect on the detection of potential problems in the credit institutions. The 
resu lts of our study also indicate that the regulatory environment influence risk 
taking by financial institutions. The use of an advanced detection system incorpo-
rating external variables related to the regulatory environment is very useful for Eu-
ropean banks. We found that a bank can resist to the turbulence when it has an ex-
plicit insurance system, when the central bank has monitoring power and take dis-
ciplinary measures to supervisors for their management.
Conclusion
This paper presented a model for detecting problems that the distressed banks may 
know. 
The sample consists of 368 institutions from eight countries. The analysis showed 
that financial ratios relating to the rating system for predicting default CAMEL are 
correlated with the likelihood of problems measured by binary variables. 
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A bank in distress, which represents specific characteristics, can be summarized as 
follows: a low ratio of capital, poor management and low profitability. In front of dif-
ficulties, banks earn significant revenues from non-traditional activities. This result 
confirms the idea which concludes that regulation encourages banks to take more 
risks by circumventing the regulatory framework. Thus, diversification of activities 
complicates the monitoring system and increases the likelihood of difficulties. The 
establishment of deposit insurance systems which protects the depositors and makes 
risk-taking more expensive would further aggravate the moral hazard. So believing 
they are protected, the banks take more risks. In return, the presence of auditors 
providing information to regulators in case of rules default reduces potential prob-
lems in the banks. Moreover, sanction against negligent managers would be recom-
mended. Similarly, the decreasing relationship between default probability and the 
role of the Central Bank in monitoring activity demonstrates that this organization 
plays an important role in maintaining stability and control of credit institutions. 
Overall, the results of the analysis, given the limitations of the technique have con-
firmed that a robustness tightening of supervision and control are able to reduce the 
probability of credit institutions distress. This conclusion might create problems of 
costs to establish this measure. From another point of view, it is likely to encourage 
banks to innovate more and harden supervision. Ultimately, we note that this study 
can be further enriched if one takes into account other types of variables.
Indeed, the predictive power of the model can be improved by adding variables that 
take into account the macroeconomic environment (inflation, growth rate of GDP, 
(Wong, 2010)). We can also add variables which describe the state of governance 
(internal, external) or use artificial intelligence as the adaptive Neuro-Fuzzy infer-
ence system (Giovanis, 2010) and artificial neuronal network (Shu and Lin, 2010).
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